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Beyond "Formal" versus 
"Informal" Education.' 
Uses of Psychological Theory in 
Anthropological Research 
CLAUDIA STRAUSS 
For at least the last ten years l cross-cultural research on the cognitive 
consequences of education has been dominated by the theoretical 
dichotomy between "formal" and "informal" education. The para-
digm of formal education is the style of schooling developed in the in-
dustrialized West. It has been defined as any form of education that is 
deliberate, carried on "out of context" in a special setting outside of 
the routines of daily life, and made the responsibility of the larger 
social group. "Informal education" refers to education that takes 
place "in context" as children participate in everyday adult activities. 
It is the predominant form in many nonindustrialized societies 
(Scribner and Cole 1973:555). Research guided by the formal/in-
formal dichotomy typically has taken tests of memory, tests of logical 
reasoning, and other tests standardized on Western schoolchildren to 
a society where schooling is not universal. There schooled (formally 
educated) and unschooled (informally educated) children's perform-
ance on the tests are compared, and, time and again, the unschooled 
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children's performance is found to be inferior. A reasonable conclu-
sion to draw from this research would be that formal education (or, at 
least, Western schooling) improves cognitive abilities across the board 
and should be encouraged in international development efforts. 
Recent comparative education research has been much more 
culturally sensitive (see, e.g., Lave 1977; Scribner and Cole 1981). 
Yet, the formal/informal dichotomy remains the model by which 
these findings have been interpreted (Greenfield and Lave 1982; Cole 
and D'Andrade 1982). Lave probably expressed the frustration of 
many others when she wrote recently, "We cannot afford to hold as 
our principal basis for comparing educational forms the school-
centric, simplified dichotomy of formal and informal education" 
(1982: 185). She went on to express the following belief: 
It seems unlikely that those traditions within cognitive psychology and learning 
theory, based on nineteenth-century models of the mind-out-of-its-sociallcultural-
context, will provide the theory we need, for they reflect the same biases that burden 
us when we treat school as the normative exemplar of "education." [1982:186] 
I agree with Lave that the formal/informal dichotomy needs to be 
replaced. My primary aim in this paper is to propose a less ethno-
centric taxonomy in its place. However, I disagree with Lave's conten-
tion that psychological theory has nothing to offer here; in fact, my 
replacement is drawn from recent research in cognitive psychology. 
An additional goal of this paper, therefore, is to defend the use of 
psychological theorizing in anthropological research. Although my 
discussion will be focused on cross-cultural cognitive research, some of 
my points are intended to have more general applicability. 
I 
Lave is not alone in her distrust of psychology. Crick's recent 
review (1982) of research in the "anthropology of knowledge," for 
example, aired the suspicion that "cross-cultural psychology is no 
more than cultural arrogance, since it foists our cultural constructs 
onto others as if they had some inherent superiority" (1982:290). 
How well-founded is this attitude? 
Anthropologists have good reason to be suspicious of psycholog-
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ical research. Many of the difficulties of cross-cultural cognitive 
research, in particular, have been pointed out repeatedly. Poor 
translation of tests, use of nonindigenous concepts or materials, and 
subjects' unfamiliarity with the testing context led to poor per-
formance that was too readily interpreted as indicating inferior 
ability. Psychologists have overlooked the social context of the 
testing interchange-how subjects' understanding of what the ex-
perimenter expects can be different from the experimenter's under-
standing. Comparison groups chosen to test the effect of a single 
variable (lack of schooling, for example) actually differed in many 
other respects as well. The very premise of the tests (the skills at 
which Western schoolchildren excel are the only ones worth study-
ing) were ethnocentric. (Rogoff 1981 and Curran 1980 are good 
reviews of these issues.) 
In addition to these oft-noted methodological weaknesses, there 
was a problematic assumption that lay at the heart of cognitive 
theorizing. This was the belief that cognitive performance is deter-
mined by very broad faculties, such as "short-term memory," "for-
mal operational schema," or "intelligence." On this model, for ex-
ample, experiments that test immediate recall- whether of 
syllables, songs, or stories - are all studying performance of a single 
short-term memory faculty. For cross-cultural research this model 
implies that non-Western subjects' poor performance (with valid 
tests) at particular cognitive tasks is indicative of broad cognitive 
deficits (Rogoff 1981). 
A number of cognitive psychologists are now questioning this 
model of mind. Gardner (1983) proposes that the storage of dif-
ferent cognitive contents (language, spatial, musical, kinesthetic, 
etc.) in separate regions of the brain leads to cognitive ability being 
differentiated by content area. Fischer (1980) has broken down 
Piaget's structure d'ensemble into more narrowly defined cognitive 
structures that can mature at different rates. D. A. Allport (1980) and 
others believe that cognitive processing is spread out among millions 
of neural systems tuned in to specific kinds of input, unguided by 
any kind of "central processor." Cole and Scribner (1974) suggest 
that cognitive performance reflects practice using or combining 
specialized "functional systems," rather than possession of general-
ized abilities. (See also Cole, Sharp, and Lave 1976.) Despite impor-
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tant differences among these theories, all have the implication that 
if poor performance at a given cognitive task indicates any cognitive 
deficits at all , it is only deficits of a narrowly defined sort. No 
general conclusions can be drawn about subjects' "intelligence" or 
"memory." 
One reason to reconsider the role of psychological theory in cross· 
cultural research, therefore, is that recent theorizing is more amen· 
able than earlier theories were to sensitive research. Another reason 
is one that has always been true: the experimental psychological 
method is better able to assess the influence of particular variables 
on outcomes than the holistic anthropological method is . Where 
practical applications are at stake , as they are in educational an-
thropology, this is especially important. Psychological theory allows 
the educator to relate particular desired outcomes to particular 
educational processes. In my presentation of a taxonomy of forms of 
learning I will stress generalizations about process-outcome relations 
that may hold cross-culturally. A cultural relativism that would 
question any such evaluative generalizations might indeed forestall 
inappropriate foisting of Western values on non-Western peoples. 
Such a cultural relativism has a drawback, however. It also prevents 
consideration of how non-Western practices and theories could im-
prove our own . 
II 
The discussion in the last section hints at the drawbacks of the for-
mal/informal dichotomy and the criteria I will use for its replace-
ment. Not only is the dichotomy ethnocentric, but its categories are 
too broadly conceived as whole institutional contexts rather than 
particular cognitive processes. Categorization by institutional con-
text might be desirable for some purposes, but not for the goal of 
understanding why different forms of education lead to different 
cognitive outcomes. A particularly egregious example is the fact that 
discussions of the concomitants of each form of education always in-
clude the criterion that relatives are appropriate teachers in infor-
mal education, while nonrelatives are more appropriate teachers in 
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formal education (Greenfield and Lave 1982; Scribner and Cole 
1973). Whether relatives or nonrelatives are teachers doubtless has 
important consequences for personality development (Herzog 1962) 
and may also influence the value the learner attaches to the instruc-
tion. There is no reason , however, to suppose it affects the sort of 
cognitive variables these researchers have been studying. Similarly, 
the importance of the educational setting and the whole concept of 
"out of context" versus "in context" are poorly explained. Scribner 
and Cole (1973) cite Western math education as a paradigm of out-
of-context learning, because "the child is asked to learn material 
that has no natural, that is, nonsymbolic, context" (1973:557). Yet , 
isn't this also true of instruction in the ways of ghosts, which we 
equally believe to have "no natural context?" This, however, is con-
sidered an example of informal education. In addition, the traits 
said to be associated with formal and informal education are not 
always found together. Thus, informal education, which is supposed 
to be largely nonverbal, may consist of demonstrations accompanied 
by many commands and comments (Childs and Greenfield 1980; 
Greenfield and Lave 1982). Finally, discussion and research based 
on the formal/informal dichotomy really seems to be about the dif-
ference between Western-style schooling and all other forms. The 
broader category of "formal education" lets in forms of education 
(such as tribal initiation rites or on-the-beach navigation instruction 
in Puluwat) that have many of the traits ascribed to informal educa-
tion (learning is not depersonalized , maintenance of continuity and 
tradition are valued, and learners are highly motivated).2 
The taxonomy I am offering as a replacement for the formal/in-
formal dichotomy categorizes forms of learning by the cognitive pro-
cesses they tap. This should result in a framework better suited to 
cross-cultural research on the cognitive consequences of education, 
although not well suited for other purposes. There is no attempt here 
to offer a complete theory of socialization or to explain affective out-
comes of learning. A more serious limitation on my taxonomy is that 
the psychological theories I draw on cannot account for learning of 
altered states of consciousness, which is important in many societies. 
A more adequate psychological theory would need to encompass such 
forms of learning as well. 
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III 
In constructing my framework for categorizing forms of education 
some psychological concepts were suitable as they stood; others had to 
be altered. One distinction in the cognitive psychology literature 
worked very well for my purposes: that between intentional and in-
cidental learning. Another - between well-defined and ill-defined 
problems-needed very minor modification. A third-among dif-
ferent acquisition strategies - I have altered drastically here, choosing 
categories that are not recognized in the current psychological 
literature. The interrelations among these concepts can be repre-
sented as a branching tree (see Figure 1). 
Given the particularistic view of cognition I put forward in the last 
section, it may seem surprising that the taxonomy I propose has only 
seven categories. Is intentional learning of chemistry really the same 
LEARNING PROCESSES IN 
DIFFERENT FORMS OF EDUCATION 
Intentional 
Well-Defined Procedures 
Attention-Directing 
Acquisition Strategy 
(e.g., guided demon-
stration learning; 
reading texts for gist; 
most W. African 
bush schoollearning3) 
I 
Rehearsal Acquisi-
tion Stragegy 
(e.g., rote learn-
ing aspects of 
Western-style 
schooling) 
Figure 1. 
Incidental 
(e.g., most early 
childhood learning) 
]I-Defined Procedures 
(e.g., tria/-and-error 
learning; Japanese 
math instruction) 
Chanting Acquisi-
tion Strategy 
(e.g., traditional 
Quranic, Hebrew & 
Vedic schooling) 
Other? 
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as intentional learning of cooking? With exceptions to be noted in the 
course of the discussion, I will argue that the process-outcome rela-
tions I describe do hold for a variety of contents. Even if different 
cognitive contents are processed by specialized structures, they might 
all be processed in the same way. 
Below, I describe the concepts in the diagram in some detail, ad-
ducing examples of their application to different forms of education 
and extrapolating from the experimental literature their probable 
cognitive consequences. 
A. INCIDENTAL VERSUS INTENTIONAL LEARNING 
The most basic distinction between different forms of education 
divides forms of learning that are intentional from those that are in-
cidental. In intentional learning what the learner remembers is "the 
product of deliberate attempts to remember," while in incidental 
learning there is no deliberate attempt to remember, rather, what the 
learner remembers is the "result of interaction with a relatively mean-
ingful environment"4 (Brown 1975: 106). What counts here is the in-
tention of the leamer, rather than the teacher. Thus, a two-year-old 
girl's familiarity with certain pieces of music, developed because her 
parents deliberately played these pieces to train her "ear," would be 
considered an instance of incidental rather than intentional learning. 
(As this example illustrates, however, whether the learner recognizes 
the situation as one in which he or she is supposed to be learning can 
depend on environmental cues arranged by others.) 
Much of our ordinary knowledge of the world-that grass is green, 
dogs bark, and lunch precedes supper-is the result of incidental 
learning. The same is true of many of our skills, from learning 
customary rules of social exchange to speaking our native tongue. 
Although children do practice speech, most of what we know of the 
vocabulary, syntax, and phonetics of our native tongue was just 
"picked up" in incidental learning. Foreign language study in school, 
on the other hand, is a good example of intentional learning. 
Although some aspects of language learning in this context may be in-
cidental' for example, permissible sound combinations and 
customary stress patterns, typically the schoolchild learns by memor-
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izing vocabulary lists and rules of grammar. With few exceptions, 
school learning is designed to be intentional learning. 
In this society school buildings and class period bells serve to mark 
a place and time for intentional learning. In other societies a week· 
long adolescent initiation ceremony would serve as an equally 
dramatic way of saying to the initiate, "Remember well what you are 
taught at this time." In any society, however, there are less institu· 
tionalized ways of signaling that something is to be learned deliberate-
ly: a raised voice and eye contact with the learner could suffice. Prob· 
ably there is no society in which intentional learning is absent, and it 
might be as common in a society without formal schooling as it is in a 
society with such schooling. 
Most of the examples I have given of incidental learning are of skills 
or knowledge picked up by young children. Although incidental 
learning takes place throughout life, it predominates over intentional 
learning in young children because it is some time before they fully 
develop the skills needed to learn deliberately. This is especially true if 
memorization is involved. Brown (1975) lists a number of studies that 
review the findings in this area. Children as old as eight or nine are 
still improving their skills in spontaneously elaborating and categoriz· 
ing material to facilitate its acquisition and retrieval and even in 
recognizing when an extra effort will have to be made to learn some· 
thing (Brown 1977). Under some circumstances even college students 
will do better on an incidental than an intentional recall task (Brans-
ford et al. 1977). A distinction has to be made, however, between dif· 
ficulty in applying the appropriate learning strategy spontaneously 
and inability to apply a strategy even under instruction - between 
production and mediation problems, in the current jargon. Long 
before children become efficient intentional learners on their own, 
they are capable of it with help. 
In other words, one factor affecting the effectiveness of intentional 
versus incidental learning is the cognitive development of the learner. 
Another is the nature of the leamer's interaction with the material to 
be learned. A number of experiments have demonstrated that sub· 
jects in incidental recall tests perform at least as well as subjects in· 
structed to remember the material, provided the task instructions 
lead the former to pay attention to the material and process it in a 
meaningful way. For example, preschool children asked only to 
classify pictures recalled them better than children instructed to 
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remember the pictures (Smirnov and Zinchenko 1969, in Brown 
1975. See also Glass, Holyoak, and Santa 1979:138-139). 
A final variable impinging on the effectiveness of incidental versus 
intentional learning is the nature of the material to be learned. Ac-
cording to Brown, "If a child engages in a meaningful activity or ex-
periences a meaningful event, he will retain the essential features of 
that activity, whether or not a deliberate intention to remember has 
been evoked" (Brown 1975:126). "Meaningful" is rarely defined in 
such discussions, but it is usually assumed that classifying an experi-
menter's list of words is not a meaningful activity, while most of what 
one does outside of the experimental laboratory is meaningful. School 
subjects are more or less meaningful depending on whether their 
presentation leads the learner to relate the material to previous 
knowledge or treat it like the experimenter's arbitrary word lists. Part 
of meaningfulness here is familiarity, because a familiar sequence or 
type of event can be partly reconstructed from memory of similar se-
quences or events. The well-known Chase and Simon (1973) test of 
chess players' memory illustrates this principle. Chess masters shown 
an arbitrary arrangement of pieces on a board remembered their 
positions no better than weaker players did. When the masters were 
shown a possible middle-game arrangement, however, they 
remembered the positions of the pieces much better than weaker 
players did, because the positions represented configurations that 
could be labeled and then recalled or reconstructed as following from 
such-and-such an opening with x, y, and z variations (Chase and 
Simon 1973). 
There is a danger in reconstructing one's memory of a specific 
event from memory of similar events, however: it is easy to forget idio-
syncratic details of the particular event and to confuse it with the 
more familiar type. Spiro (1977) conducted an experiment that in-
dicates that the likelihood of this occurring is especially great in in-
cidental recall situations. Different groups of subjects heard about a 
couple planning to marry. All subjects were told that the man did not 
want children; for some subjects the woman reacted favorably, for 
others, she reacted unfavorably, to this news. Some subjects in each 
group were then told in an offhand manner that the couple were later 
happily married; others that the wedding was called off. Thus, some 
subjects heard a sequence that is not typical in real life (e.g., disagree-
ment over whether to have children, followed by a happy marriage), 
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while others heard a more familiar sequence (e.g., no disagreement 
over whether to have children, followed by a happy marriage). Fur-
thermore, some of the subjects had been told they were participating 
in a memory test, while others were told only that the experimenters 
were interested in their reactions to social interaction situations. The 
latter (incidental) memory group made significantly more errors in 
recalling the unfamiliar version of the story after a delay than the sub-
jects who deliberately memorized the unfamiliar version did. This dif-
ference between intentional and incidental groups was not found 
when they were recalling a familiar version of the story. Thus, inten-
tional recall may be superior to incidental recall when idiosyncratic 
details need to be remembered . 
In sum, what does all of this show for the effectiveness of forms of 
education that rely on incidental versus intentional learning?5 
Especially for young children, provided they are interested enough to 
attend to the matter in question and provided this material is mean-
ingful for them, incidental learning appears to be at least as effective 
as intentional learning of a particular skill or subject matter. Whether 
it is more effective is not clear. The experiments in which subjects did 
better on incidental than on intentional memory tasks were those in 
which they were led to perform activities, such as imposing taxonomic 
classifications on words or objects, that they would not normally do in 
a real-life incidental learning situation. Spiro (1977), however, argues 
that instructions to memorize lead learners to compartmentalize the 
material to be learned instead of integrating it with their existing 
knowledge. He implies that in the long run compartmentalized 
material may be harder to retrieve than better integrated material. 
To the extent, then, that incidental learning leads to better integra-
tion than intentional learning, it may be more effective for long-term 
learning. 
Forms of education that lead to deliberate learning, on the other 
hand, appear to be necessary where the learner would not otherwise 
be motivated to attend to the material, or where verbatim recall or 
recall of events with idiosyncratic details is necessary. The importance 
of the learner's motivation to attend to the material, by the way, il-
lustrates that while "affective" and "cognitive" factors can be studied 
separately, in a given learning situation they are actually intertwined. 
BEYOND "FORMAL" VERSUS "INFORMAL" EDUCATION 205 
B. WELL-DEFINED VERSUS ILL-DEFINED LEARNING PROCEDURES 
Intentional learning situations can be subdivided into those in 
which the learner is faced with relatively well-defined learning pro-
cedures and those in which there are relatively ill-defined learning 
procedures. These terms are cribbed from the distinction drawn in 
the artificial intelligence literature between "well-defined problems" 
and "ill-defined problems" (Reitman 1964). Glass, Holyoak, and San-
ta (1979) explicate this distinction as follows: 
In a well-defined problem the given information, operations, and goal state are all 
completely specified .. _ . Ill -defined problems, on the other hand, are those for 
which the problem solver has more uncenainty concerning the given information and 
staning materials, the operations that can be used, and the final product that must be 
achieved. [1979:394-395] 
Since in most educational contexts what varies is only how well the 
procedures are specified, I have modified the more standard termi-
nology accordingly. 6 
I've also added the qualifier "relatively" to well-defined and ill-
defined, because any learning situation will have some elements of 
each type. Even an apprentice with an opportunity to watch every 
move of a master craftsman still has to choose which details of the 
performance to attend to.7 Still, it is worthwhile to analyze learning 
situations to see which procedures are specified, which left for the 
learner to choose. For brevity I will speak of learning situations with 
"well-defined" versus "ill-defined" procedures, but these should 
always be understood as marking points on a continuum, rather than 
as a strict dichotomy. 
The concepts of well-defined and ill-defined procedures can be il-
lustrated with some examples from cross-cultural studies. Consider, 
first, how girls learn to weave in two different Mayan communities. 
According to Childs and Greenfield (1980), among the maize and 
bean growing Zinacanteco Indians in Chiapas, Mexico, every adult 
woman is expected to weave cloth for her family'S clothing. Weaving 
generally takes place outdoors after women have finished their morn-
ing chores. Very young girls pick up some familiarity with weaving 
simply by casually observing their mothers at work. Later they help 
with boiling the thread and dyeing the wool. At about the age of eight 
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girls start to make a serious attempt to learn how to weave. At first 
they spend most of their time just watching the process carefully. 
Then they begin to help, working alongside their mother or another 
adult woman. In the beginning the adult gives a great deal of explicit 
guidance, both explaining and demonstrating the correct procedures. 
This guidance decreases as the girl becomes more proficient, until, at 
about the age of 12 or 13, she is competent to weave on her own. 
In another Mayan community, this one in Guatemala, weaving is 
similarly part of the household economy, rather than a specialized 
craft. Here, however, girls first learn to weave on their own using 
miniature looms with scraps ofleftover materials. Later they graduate 
to adult-size looms, but still receive very little explicit guidance from 
adults. Typically, the only advice they receive is from older siblings 
who do not know much about the process themselves. 8 The Zina-
canteco girls who learn to weave by watching their elders need to do 
little thinking about the best way to weave, because the procedures 
are completely demonstrated for them. Their learning takes place by 
following well-defined procedures. The Guatemalan girls learning to 
weave by trial and error, on the other hand, must consciously figure 
out the best way to achieve the finished results they see around them. 
The procedures they should follow are ill-defined. 
For another example, consider how math is taught in the United 
States and in Japan. In the United States mathematics instruction is 
oriented toward learning certain algorithms for performing addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, and division of whole numbers, fractions, 
and decimals. Typically, students become proficient at performing 
the algorithms before they are able to apply them comfortably to 
"story problems." 
InJapan, on the other hand, children are presented with challeng-
ing story problems before they learn the most efficient techniques for 
solving them. In some classrooms there is extensive discussion of the 
problem, both between teacher and students and among the students 
in small groups. Some teachers only give hints regarding the best 
algorithm for solving the problem, encouraging the students to try to 
discover it for themselves (Easley and Easley 1982). The result is a 
leisurely, "Zen-like" process that leaves Western observers wondering 
impatiently when the teacher will get to the point. 9 In American 
math instruction, which begins by explaining how to perform a cer-
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tain type of operation, then proceeds by giving examples in which the 
algorithm is applied, the procedures to be followed are well-defined. 
By contrast, the Japanese practice of asking children to try to solve 
problems before the most efficient algorithm is taught them exempli-
fies a teaching strategy in which procedures are ill-defined. 
Under the informal/formal model, the differences between the 
Zinacantecan and Guatemalan Mayan methods of learning to weave 
are ignored. They are both considered examples of informal educa-
tion, with supposedly similar cognitive outcomes. Likewise, the dif-
ferences between Japanese and United States math education are ig-
nored. They are both examples of formal education, again, with sup-
posedly similar cognitive outcomes.1O In fact, the ill-defined Japanese 
math education procedures and Guatemalan Mayan way of learning 
to weave have an important resemblance in cognitive outcomes. In 
each case, learners seem to be able to use their skills or knowledge in a 
wider variety of contexts than their counterparts taught with better 
defined procedures. 
Thus, while the Zinacanteco weavers learn only how to reproduce 
the same small set of designs traditionally woven in their culture, the 
Guatemalan weavers go on to create original designs. This could, of 
course, be due solely to a difference in cultural values. Possibly the 
Guatemalan Mayan community values innovation and the Zinacan-
tecan community does not, but Zinacantecan weavers could create 
original designs if they had to. Greenfield and Childs's (1980) experi-
ments, however, suggest otherwise. They found that the Zinacanteco 
girls could not easily reproduce original designs using colored sticks, 
although most of them had no problem reproducing their traditional 
designs with the sticks. Greenfield herself speculates that the observa-
tion method of learning among the Zinacanteco and the trial-and-
error method of learning among the Guatemalan Mayans are respon-
sible for the difference in their originality. 
Correspondingly, Japanese students are capable of using their math 
ability to solve a greater variety of problems than American students 
at the same grade level can solve, according to international 
mathematics achievement tests (Easley and Easley 1982). This result 
should not be credited too hastily to greater inherent mathematics 
talent among the Japanese or to the exhortations of devoted Japanese 
mothers. Jack Easley, a researcher and consultant on math and 
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science education, spent nearly four months observing math educa-
tion in Japan- When he returned to the United States he used the 
Japanese emphasis on story problems to help a Chicago elementary 
school teacher improve the mathematics problem solving skills of her 
inner-city students. After three months of this approach the class all 
came up to grade level on standardized mathematics achievement 
tests, and it was the first time in ten years that her students had all 
done so (Easley, personal communication). 
The conclusion I've drawn about the effects of learning with ill-
defined procedures corresponds with findings from psychological ex-
perimentation. Greenfield cites the following experiment by Kaye 
and Giannino (1978), in a North American context, to explain the 
difference between the Zinacantecan and Guatemalan weavers' 
originality: 
Their study compared three methods of teaching 8-year-old boys and adult males 
how to open a puzzle box: trial and error, verbal shaping ("you're getting wanner! 
colder"), and simple demonstration. The box opened when the subject pushed a cer-
tain button on each side. A transfer task involved an identical-looking box that 
opened when the subject pushed a button on the front. The demonstration· 
observation method produced the most effective original learning but the least sue· 
cessful transfer to a new situation. [Greenfield and Lave 1982:186] 
In an experiment more closely approximating actual teaching con-
ditions, Babikian (1970) found that when Archimedes' principle of 
buoyancy was explained to eighth graders and then demonstrated in 
the laboratory, students could repeat the principle and answer 
multiple-choice questions about it better than students left to figure it 
out for themselves by observing the sinking and floating of various ob-
jects. When questions were posed regarding the buoyancy of objects 
in novel situations, however, high ability boys and girls left to figure 
out the principle themselves outscored those who had the principle 
explained to them; low ability girls of the first group performed 
almost as well as low ability girls of the second group, and only low 
ability boys still did better if the principle had been explained first (in 
Cronbach 1977). 
To sum up, the findings of anthropological fieldwork and psycho-
logical experimentation lead to the same conclusion. Well-defined 
procedures are more efficient than ill-defined procedures at impart-
ing a particular skill or piece of information. I I On the other hand, ill-
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defined procedures, much more than well-defined procedures, pro-
mote originality and ability to apply one's skill or knowledge in a wide 
variety of contexts. 
Intuitively it makes sense that the learner who has had to make 
conscious choices among different procedures would have a better 
grasp of the consequences of alternative procedures and would be 
better able to put them into place to do original work than a learner 
who has practiced only the one right way. It seems likely, however, 
that the value of ill-defined procedures for developing transferable 
skills or knowledge would be limited to situations in which conscious 
intervention makes a difference, as, for example, in creating new 
weaving designs or solving math problems. For strictly motor skills, 
trial-and-error learning probably does not transfer to new situations. 
Thus, high jumpers who figure out a technique on their own prob-
ably cannot transfer their skills to pole vaulting any better than high 
jumpers who learn their technique from someone else. In some con-
texts, trial-and-error learning may not have any redeeming virtues. 
c. DIFFERENT TYPES OF ACQUISITION STRATEGIES 
Intentional learning situations with well-defined procedures can be 
further subdivided according to the type of acquisition strategy the 
learner employs to input the presented information into memory .12 I 
will discuss three types of strategies here: simply directing attention to 
the information, rehearsal, and chanting. This breakdown is not one 
that would be used by cognitive psychologists-they might not con-
sider attention directing to be a strategy and would question 
separating chanting from other forms of rehearsal- but it is a useful 
way to distinguish among the different forms of education found 
cross-culturally. 
(1) Directing attention. Directing one's attention to some display is 
the minimum strategy necessary for all forms of intentional learning, 
and, often, it is all that is necessary. If I want to remember the plot of 
an interesting novel, all I have to do is read it. The plot will stick with 
me without my making any particular effort to memorize it. Similar-
ly, if I were to watch my mother gather roots and berries on several 
different expeditions, I would eventually form a detailed knowledge 
of edible and inedible varieties, where they are found, and how to 
harvest them, without having done anything more to learn all of this 
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than deciding to watch. (This information could also be picked up in-
cidentally, but in that case it's not correct to say that the attention-
directing strategy was employed.) 
These examples indicate some of the features of attention directing 
as an acquisition strategy. First, it is applicable to both propositional 
knowledge (e.g., knowing that Madame Bovary is about a bored 
young French housewife) and to skills (e.g., knowing how to forage 
for roots and berries). 
Second, it is most effective when applied to meaningful material 
that does not have to be learned verbatim. In the typical laboratory 
experiment, simple attention directing is not sufficient. When 
children were asked to remember a few pictures from a larger array, 
those who rehearsed the names of the pictures did better than those 
who did not rehearse and, presumably, did nothing more than attend 
to the array (Hagen and Stanovich 1977). In this respect, the 
attention-directing strategy is like incidental learning. 
Third, the attention-directing strategy is often used outside of sym-
bolically well-defined learning situations, which means that its use is 
not obvious to the outside observer. This has led some researchers to 
overlook the possibility that it occurs and to see incidental learning as 
the main alternative to formal schooling. Using Daniel Wagner's 
data on Yucatec Mayan subjects Cole and Scribner (1977) expected 
"absolute levels of incidental recall to be higher for the less educated 
subjects on the assumption that much of what they know is 'picked 
up' rather than deliberately learned" (1977:252). Their hypothesis 
was not confirmed. One reason why it failed might be an incorrect 
assumption that incidental learning is the predominant form among 
unschooled populations. Perhaps intentional learning is as common 
among unschooled populations as among schooled populations, but 
a simple attention-directing strategy prevails over more elaborate 
mnemonic strategies. On the other hand, it could be true that un-
schooled Yucatec Mayan children do much more incidental than in-
tentional learning- but this possibility should be investigated em-
pirically rather than assumed a priori, keeping in mind the subtle 
cues that may be the only indications that intentional learning is 
taking place. Since some observers will think of incidental learning, 
which is passive, as requiring less intelligence than any intentional 
learning process, it is important that unschooled Third World pop-
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ulations not be characterized as primarily incidental learners unless 
there is good evidence for that assertion. 
Finally, it bears repeating that not only is the attention-directing 
strategy also common in advanced industrial societies (see literary plot 
example, above), but more elaborate strategies are doubtless em-
ployed in the many instances in other societies where verbatim recall 
is necessary; for example, when Maori speech makers memorize stock 
phrases and proverbs or Iatmul men learn thousands of clan names 
(Salmond 1975; Bateson 1958). 
(2) Rehearsal. Rehearsal is probably the best-studied acquisition 
strategy because experimental studies of memory usually have sub-
jects memorize arbitrary nonsense syllables or word lists-the kind of 
material that is not easily remembered otherwise. Although experi-
mental psychologists usually distinguish between simple rote rehear-
sal and more elaborate strategies that combine rehearsal with tax-
onomic categorization, self-testing, or adding meaningful links be-
tween arbitrary stimulus pairs, these distinctions are not necessary 
for the sake of categorizing the forms of education found around the 
world. Wherever recall of relatively meaningless material is ex-
pected, good students will eventually learn whatever modifications 
of the basic rehearsal strategy are necessary to retain the material at 
hand. 
The use of "students" in the last sentence was deliberate, because 
formal schooling in most parts of the world typically demands a 
greater use of the rehearsal strategy than does education outside of 
schools. First of all, "rehearsal" should be understood here to refer 
only to repetition of verbal material. We commonly speak of 
rehearsing music, a play, or a gymnastic routine, but psychologists' 
findings about rehearsal of verbal material may not generalize to 
these other domains , so these examples should be distinguished from 
rehearsal of verbal materials. Since much non school learning is of 
skills like cooking or farming, the question of rehearsal of verbal 
material never arises. What verbal directives are given in the course 
of such instruction either need not be remembered verbatim or are 
usually repeated so often that simply paying attention will result in 
their being remembered. The same is true of the myths and ac-
counts of group history told for entertainment, instruction, and 
social validation around the world - there is no need for most 
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members of the audience to rehearse this information. The same 
cannot be said of learning to connect a list of early explorers of the 
Americas with the places they visited or memorizing the conjugation 
of Latin verbs. Although these facts could be presented in a way that 
would make rehearsal unnecessary-through frequent repetition or 
presentation in a meaningful context-usually they are notY 
For short·term recall of relatively meaningless material, especial-
ly, rehearsal is a more effective strategy than simply directing atten-
tion to the material (Gates 1917). On the other hand, unless rehears-
al is combined with conversion of arbitrary material into meaningful 
material, it is not very effective for delayed recall. For effective long-
term verbal memory it is helpful if the material can be 
integrated into the existing knowledge base, so that the material 
need not be recalled as a separate unit but can be reconstructed 
from other things known (Brown 1975). 
(3) Chanting. In widely varying times and places societies have hit 
upon the same method of conducting elementary education - stu-
dents memorize material by repeating it, in sing-song fashion, 
aloud. This was true in the Indian pathSala, the Hebrew cheder, 
and the one-room schoolhouse of 18th-century America, and is still 
true in Q.uranic schools (Pollak 1981, 1982a, 1982b; Scribner and 
Cole 1981).14 
The conventional view of chanting would be that it is nothing 
more than one type of rehearsal-one in which quasi-musical and 
rhythmic cues are added to facilitate recall, or in which the material 
being memorized (in traditional religious schools) consists, almost 
exclusively, of lengthy prose passages, rather than the disconnected 
facts the Western schoolchild typically learns. If this is so, then cer-
tain qualitative features of rehearsal learning should apply to chant-
ing learning: the primacy effect in serial recall (improved recall of 
the first few items in a series) or increase in children's recall capacity 
with age, for example. So far as I know, no research has been done 
in Western experimental laboratories to see whether chanting does 
have the same features as nonrhythmic and/or silent rehearsal. 
There is, however, some cross-cultural data that strongly suggest 
that chanting is a distinct type of acquisition strategy. 
In the last ten years there have been some interesting investigations 
of Quranic students' memorization abilities. Much to the surprise of 
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researchers studying the perfonnance of these subjects, who devote 
practically all of their school time to memorizing the Q.uran, they 
have done very poorly on standard serial and free recall tests. On the 
serial recall tests they, like unschooled subjects, do not show a 
primacy effect-one sign of rehearsal (Wagner 1978; Scribner and 
Cole 1981). Wagner has attempted to explain these results by claim-
ing that since Q.uranic students have been memorizing a body of 
meaningful prose, the Q.uran, they have been using the "semantic" 
memory system, whereas his and others' experiments on memory of 
arbitrary collections of pictures or words call on the "episodic" 
memory system (Wagner 1981:203). This explanation is unsatisfac-
tory. Although "semantic" and "episodic" are used differently by dif-
ferent researchers, there is general agreement that semantic memory 
involves memory for gist rather than exact reproduction of input. 
Since Q.uranic students are expected to learn the scriptures word for 
word, gist memory is not sufficient. They are clearly involved in 
something closer to episodic than semantic memory, if either of these 
categories is appropriate. 
A much better explanation for the Q.uranic students' poor per-
fonnance is that they are accustomed to using a chanting acquisition 
strategy and chanting should be viewed as a separate genus of acquisi-
tion strategies, rather than as a species of rehearsal. Some telling 
evidence for this supposition can be drawn from a close examination 
of Scribner and Cole's (1981) research on Q.uranic students' mnemonic 
abilities. In a free recall study, subjects classified 24 common objects. 
They were asked to recall those objects, then the names of the objects 
were read aloud and, again, subjects were asked to recall them in any 
order. Regression analysis did not find any direct evidence that 
Q.uranic study made any difference in perfonnance at these tasks 
(Scribner and Cole: 125, 223). In a subsequent study, the authors 
"tried to model the procedures more closely on Q.ur'anic remem-
bering." Pictures of common objects were presented o,ne at a time. 
For five subsequent trials as the experimenter presented a card, the 
subject had to name the next card. On this serial anticipation test 
Q.uranic students perfonned better than nonliterates, but less well 
than Western-schooled students. Finally, after more observation of 
the methods of Q.uranic instruction (and after a few modifications), 
Scribner and Cole devised the following test, using 16 drawings of 
common objects: 
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The experimenter laid the picture cards face down in a row in the predetermined 
order as he explained the procedure: "Here I have sixteen cards with different pic· 
tures on them, face down on the table. First I'll show you one and name it to you . 
Then , when I put it face down on the table, you name the picture you saw. Then I'll 
name and show you two . When I tum their faces down on the table, you name the 
pictures, but starting from the first one up to the picture I last named and showed to 
you. That's how you'll continue to name them until we get to sixteen. But always 
remember to start naming from the first picture to the last named and shown to you ." 
[Scribner and Cole 1981 :229] 
On this test the Quranic students outperformed all other groups 
tested, including Western-schooled students, and regression analysis 
showed years of study of the Quran to be a factor significantly affect-
ing recall (Scribner and Cole 1981:230). 
The authors attribute the Quranic students' improved perform-
ance on the last test to use of a similar "incremental" method of 
teaching in Quranic schools, although they comment in a footnote 
that more detailed observations have shown this method to be "most 
prominent in early learning stages" (1981:319) . This makes it puzzl-
ing why better incremental recall should be correlated with increased 
years of Quranic schooling. An alternative explanation for the results 
of Scribner and Cole's series of tests is that the more practice the sub-
jects had at naming test items out loud, the greater the advantage of 
Quranic students over other groups. In the initial free recall test, sub-
jects were not instructed to practice saying the names of the objects 
aloud and the Quranic students did no better than anyone else. 15 On 
the serial anticipation test, subjects had an opportunity to say the 
names of the pictures out loud, although their practice would have 
had hesitations and inaccuracies because they had to recall an item 
before naming it. Quranic students did relatively better at this task, 
although less well than Western-schooled subjects. In the final task, 
subjects had the opportunity to practice chanting the names of the 
pictures after the experimenter said them. Under these conditions, 
most similar to Quranic schooling, the Quranic students outper-
formed all other groups. These results make the hypothesis that 
chanting is a special type of acquisition strategy difficult to ignore. 
They also show that Western-schooled students' skill at rehearsal does 
not transfer to a situation where a different acquisition strategy is 
necessary. 
These cross-cultural findings fit with one current model of cogni-
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tion that sees song storage and language storage as mediated by dif-
ferent brain structures (Gardner 1975). It may be that material 
learned by chanting is cognitively processed as songs are - and re-
called in the same effortless way that songs can be. This could be the 
physiological basis of the preference for chanting to facilitate rote 
memorization in so many cultures. 
(4) Other.' In Bali, Japan, and doubtless many other societies, 
children learn a variety of motor skills by having their limbs put 
through the motions of the activity being learned (Bateson and Mead 
1942; Benedict 1946). Further research may show that this acquisi-
tion strategy shows unique learning curves or other properties that 
would indicate it should be distinguished from the others I have 
discussed. Further cross-cultural research will doubtless bring addi-
tional acquisition strategies to light. This "other" category indicates 
my recognition that my taxonomy is probably incomplete. 
The distinctions I have described above - between incidental and 
intentional learning, learning with ill-defined versus well-defined pro-
cedures, and use of different acquisition strategies-were chosen 
because there was a certain amount of experimental data available 
about them and because they held promise for constructing a refined 
taxonomy of the forms of learning found cross-culturally. There are 
other leads that might be investigated profitably. One is Rogoffs in-
teresting research relating Mayan mothers' teaching styles (verbal in-
struction vs. demonstration) to their children's performance on dif-
ferent types of memory tests (verbal vs. spatial). Verbal instruction led 
to better performance on verbal memory tests only - its superiority 
did not carry over to spatial memory tests (Rogoff 1981). Another is 
D'Andrade's (1981) distinction between content-based and recoding 
abstraction. An example of the former is the "chunking" of individual 
moves into meaningful combinations that a chess player learns: more 
abstract categories come to be used, but these are expressed in the 
same medium (patterns of chess pieces) as the phenomena being 
categorized. With recoding abstraction, on the other hand, there is a 
translation into formal algorithms expressed in a different medium. 
The estimating procedures of unschooled tailors would be an example 
of content-based abstractions, while the school-learned techniques of 
translating apples and oranges into x's and y's would exemplify use of 
recoding abstraction. D'Andrade believes the latter is a less natural, 
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more effortful sort of abstraction (D'Andrade 1981). The difference 
between these types of cognitive processes may be what really 
underlies the differences that have been labeled "in context" versus 
"out of context" learning. 16 
IV 
As the experiments reported in the last section indicate, current 
cross-cultural cognitive researchers have begun to move beyond "the 
more schooling the better" hypotheses that used to dominate the 
field. Yet, even though this research has turned up important dif-
ferences among the forms of education grouped together by the terms 
"formal" and "informal" education, there has not been a significant 
effort to replace that dichotomy with a more useful set of categories. 
My primary purpose in this paper was to meet this need. My taxonomy 
is not necessarily exhaustive, but the basic categories of incidental 
learning, intentional learning with ill-defined procedures, and inten-
tionallearning with well-defined procedures (and attention-directing, 
rehearsal, or chanting acquisition strategies) encompass most of the 
important forms of learning present around the world, while high-
lighting their different cognitive effects. 
From an anthropological standpoint, my taxonomy has some 
unusual features. First, it slices across institutional forms, placing 
some of their learning situations in one category, some in another. 
Thus in Western secondary schools, math and literature classes may 
require use of the attention-directing acquisition strategy, while Latin 
classes demand use of the rehearsal acquisition strategy. Second, it 
highlights similarities between the forms of education found in pre-
industrial and industrial societies, placing instances of each in the 
same category in several cases. For example, both Japanese school-
children in their math classes and Guatemalan Mayan girls learning 
to weave are engaged in intentional learning with ill-defined proce-
dures. Likewise, Zinacantecan girls learning to weave by watching 
their elders and college students learning the features of French Sur-
realist poetry by reading it are equally using a simple attention-
directing strategy in intentional learning with well-defined pro-
cedures. 
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These features of my approach could be criticized on the grounds 
that I am looking at learning processes out of their cultural context. 
Perhaps learning with ill-defined procedures, for example, doesn't 
"mean the same thing" in Japan as it does in Guatemala. It could be 
that ill-defined procedures are typically used in one of the societies for 
learning culturally valued subject matters and in the other society for 
learning less valued subject matters. This would be interesting and 
useful to know. Still, agreement between anthropological and psycho-
logical research about process-outcome relations - for example, that 
ill-defined procedures improve students' abilities to generalize their 
learning creatively-supports my contention that some cross-cultural 
generalizations can be drawn. For each of my categories, the general-
izations I have argued for are not of the form, x learning process is 
better than z process for all purposes. Instead, for each type I have 
shown that the effectiveness of a given learning process depends on 
characteristics of the leamer, the subject matter, the environment, 
and how the knowledge is to be used. These features mean that my 
framework provides no aid to anyone seeking to demonstrate the 
superiority of Western schooling over all other forms. The formal/in-
formal dichotomy, on the other hand, while more respectful of in-
stitutional context, encouraged research that denigrated non-
Western forms of education. 
At the beginning of this paper I quoted some remarks by anthro-
pologists who implied that much, if not all, psychological theory is in-
herently ethnocentric. I hope I have shown that this is not the case-
that psychological theory can be drawn upon to promote culturally 
sensitive research. The research that underlay the formal/informal 
education dichotomy tended to be ethnocentric in the extreme in its 
focus on the superiority of Western schooling over other forms of 
education. To recognize, as researchers are now doing, that in-
digenous forms of education can be well-adapted to needs in the 
societies where they are found is undoubtedly a great step forward. 
Yet, this cultural relativism can stop the foreign investigator from tak-
ing the important further step of asking, "How might forms of educa-
tion present in other societies prove useful in my own society?" The 
marriage of psychological theory and anthropological sensitivity may 
lead to answers to that question. 
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1 Since publication of Sylvia Scribner and Michael Cole's landmark article, "Cognitive Conse-
quences of Formal and Informal Education," (1973) . Scribner and Cole's formulation was great-
ly influenced by Bruner (1966) . 
• See traits of formal and informal education listed in Greenfield and Lave (1982). Scribner 
and Cole (1973) recognized this problem but didn't resolve it. 
• See Watkins (1943) and Caine (1959) on bush schools. 
• Incidental learning would draw on Leontiev's "natural memory," as described in Cole and 
Scri bner (1977). 
5 It may seem strange to speak of a form of education that relies on incidental learning, 
especially when it is unintentional for the teacher as well as the learner . I am using "form of 
education" to indicate any teaching or learning situation, whether designated as educative or 
not by the participants. There is also the possibility of education where the teacher deliberately 
arranges for the student to learn incidentally, as is the case in Suzuki music training. 
• Educational psychologists seem to have the same distinction in mind with the contrast be· 
tween "expository" and "inductive" teaching procedures (Cronbach 1977: 544) or between "guid-
ed" and "discovery" learning. 
7 There has been research showing that practice at control of attention and at noticing spatial 
relationships and the muscular sensations accompanying actions will lead to improved per-
formance in a variety of manual skills (Cox 1933, in Cronbach 1977:423). 
8 The Guatemalan description is from Greenfield and Lave (1982), based on research by 
Maria and James Loucky, apparently unpublished. 
• R. A. LeVine confessed to this reaction to Japanese math instruction in his comments dur-
ing a presentation by J. Easley (Easley 1982). Easley noted the connection with Zen methods of 
instruction on that occasion. 
10 To expect all the varieties of modern schooling present around the world to be alike in all 
essential respects is to ignore the possible influence of indigenous educational traditions (e.g., 
Zen instruction in Japan) and the educational models of different colonial powers. 
II There are additional experiments backing up this conclusion. Thus, subjects learning to 
trace a maze learned much faster if for the first few trials the wrong turns were clearly marked 
(Wright 1957, in Cronbach 1977)-that is, well-defined procedures led to faster maze learning 
than leaving it to the subjects to find the best path on their own. Similarly, archery students 
reached a higher level of proficiency after 18 lessons if they were shown how to stand, hold the 
bow , and release the arrow than if they were just instructed to pay attention to form but left to 
figure out the best techniques on their own (Davies 1945, in Cronbach 1977). 
It In learning situations with ill-defined procedures, once the skill or principle is figured out it 
also has to be remembered. Usually, however, the figuring-out process itself is sufficient to make 
the information easy to remember; no further effort is needed. 
I have chosen to concentrate on acquisition rather than retrieval strategies here simply 
because more is known about them. 
13 Field studies haven't borne out the formerly common belief that intentional verbatim 
memorization is more common in preliterate than in literate societies due to the absence of alter· 
native means of storing information in the former. 
14 Pollak's (1982b) discussion of Islamic education draws on Wagner and Lofti (1980) and 
other research by Wagner. 
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15 Vai-Arabic biliterates did well on this test, but that result is difficult to interpret. 
'6 There are some cross-cultural findings my taxonomy does not address : the superiority of 
schooled over less schooled subjects at Piagetian formal operations tasks; schooled subjects' 
greater willingness to solve logical syllogisms solely on the basis of the premises given; and a 
greater tendency - not found consistently - for schooled subjects to use taxonomic rather than 
functional bases of classification. The results on the Piagetian formal operations tasks are 
probably best explained by contact with scientific methodology in Western schools. As for 
schooled subjects' understanding of logical syllogisms and use of taxonomic bases of classifica-
tion, Cole and D'Andrade (1982) are probably right in attributing this to the emphasis in 
Western schooling on manipulations on "words in the absence of manipulations on objects 
and people" (1982:25). This does not happen merely because in Western schooling learning 
takes place "out of context" from everyday life - for the same can be said of institutionalized 
religious education, West African bush schooling and of tribal history learned around the 
campfire (as Scribner and Cole, 1973, point out) . The critical feature of Western schooling 
pertinent here is its emphasis on the "3 Rs," that is, on symbol systems and their use, rather 
than on particular bodies of knowledge. Of course, specific bodies of knowledge are impor-
tant, too, but rather less so in Western-style schooling than in other forms of education 
around the world. 
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